Enforcing a UAE arbitral award in Hong Kong

The UAE is named — and why that is unusual

Section 90(1) of Cap. 609 lets the Chief Executive in Council declare, by order in the Gazette, that a specified state or territory is a party to the New York Convention. Section 90(2) makes such an order, while in force, conclusive evidence of that fact. Section 90(3) preserves any other method of proof, so the order is a shortcut rather than a gateway.

The order exists and it names the UAE. The Arbitration (Parties to New York Convention) Order, Cap. 609 subsidiary legislation A, made under section 90, declares the states and territories in its Schedule to be parties; “United Arab Emirates” appears in that Schedule, between Ukraine and the United Kingdom. The current version is as at 19 March 2021, and an editorial note records that although the Order was originally made under the repealed Arbitration Ordinance (Cap. 341) it continues in force under section 110 of Cap. 609.

The practical effect is that a Hong Kong enforcement application needs no evidence at all of the UAE's treaty status. Compare England and Wales, where the equivalent list appears to have stopped being maintained in 1993 and the creditor must prove accession from the United Nations depositary record, or Singapore, where no such list exists at all. Of the destinations in this series, Hong Kong is the only one that has done the work in advance.

For completeness: the Convention applies to the HKSAR by virtue of China's declaration, and China's own reservations are carried over. Neither bites on a UAE commercial award — the reciprocity reservation is satisfied because the UAE is a Contracting State, and a commercial award satisfies the commercial reservation.

Which provisions apply, and a numbering trap

Section 2(1) defines a “Convention award” as an arbitral award made in a state or territory, other than China or any part of China, which is a party to the New York Convention. The definition is seat-based — “made in” — so a UAE-seated award qualifies on its face. The carve-out of China and its parts is what sends Mainland and Macao awards to their own Divisions; it has no bearing on a UAE award.

Here is the trap. Division 2, on Convention awards, is sections 87 to 91. Sections 92 to 98 are the Mainland Division, and sections from 98A are the Macao Division. Nothing above section 91 is authority for a UAE award, and the Mainland–HKSAR reciprocal enforcement arrangement is not the route here. We mention it only to exclude it.

Two routes are open. Section 84(1) is the general provision: an award, whether made in or outside Hong Kong, is enforceable in the same manner as a judgment of the court “but only with the leave of the Court”, and section 84(2) permits the court to enter judgment in terms of the award. Section 87(1) then gives a Convention award holder the choice of enforcing “by action in the Court” or “in the same manner as an award to which section 84 applies”. Section 87(2) makes a Convention award so enforceable binding for all purposes and available by way of defence, set-off or otherwise.

A drafting point for accurate citation: there is no separate “judgment in terms” provision inside Division 2. It arrives through section 87(1)(b) read with section 84(2). Cite both, not section 87 alone. Section 91 preserves any right to enforce or rely on a Convention award otherwise than under the Division.

Why Division 2 is better for the creditor

It is sometimes suggested that a creditor might prefer the general section 84 machinery. For a Convention award that is backwards, and the reason is a single missing paragraph.

Sections 85 and 86 apply by their own terms only to an award which is not a Convention, Mainland or Macao award. Under that non-Convention route, section 86(2)(c) allows the court to refuse enforcement “for any other reason the court considers it just to do so” — an open residual discretion.

Division 2 contains nothing of the kind. On the contrary, section 89(1) provides that enforcement of a Convention award “may not be refused except as mentioned in this section”. So a UAE award holder is in a materially stronger position for being inside Division 2, and the refusal grounds remain section 89 even where the creditor reaches the court through the section 84 machinery, because it gets there via section 87(1)(b). Order 73 rule 10(3)(a)(iv) confirms this procedurally by routing a section 87(1)(b) application to the section 88 documents.

Section 88 documents, against Article IV

Section 88 requires the duly authenticated original award or a duly certified copy; the original arbitration agreement or a duly certified copy; and, where the award or agreement is not in either or both of the official languages, a translation into an official language certified by an official or sworn translator or by a diplomatic or consular agent.

Two differences from Article IV favour the creditor. First, section 88(b) refers simply to “the original arbitration agreement”, where Article IV(1)(b) refers to the agreement “referred to in article II”. The Ordinance drops that cross-reference, and Cap. 609 instead defines an arbitration agreement by reference to section 19, which adopts Option I of Article 7 of the 2006 Model Law — materially more permissive as to form than Article II. Second, the translation duty is keyed to Hong Kong's two official languages, so an English-language UAE award of the kind DIAC, arbitrateAD and ICC practice commonly produces needs no translation at all. An Arabic-language award needs a certified English or Chinese translation; the certifier categories are the same as Article IV(2).

Since the UAE is not a party to the Apostille Convention, authentication is by consular legalisation and not by apostille.

Section 89 refusal grounds

Section 89(2) sets out the grounds the person against whom the award is invoked must prove: (a) that a party to the arbitration agreement was under some incapacity; (b) that the arbitration agreement was not valid, under the law to which the parties subjected it or, absent indication, the law of the country where the award was made; (c) that the person was not given proper notice of the appointment of the arbitrator or of the proceedings, or was otherwise unable to present its case; (d) subject to section 89(4), that the award deals with a difference outside the submission or contains decisions beyond its scope; (e) that the composition of the arbitral authority or the arbitral procedure was not in accordance with the parties' agreement or, failing agreement, the law of the country where the arbitration took place; and (f) that the award has not yet become binding, or has been set aside or suspended by a competent authority of the country in which, or under the law of which, it was made.

Like the English Act, Hong Kong splits Article V(1)(a) into two lettered grounds — incapacity at (a), invalidity at (b) — so section 89 runs (a) to (f) where the Convention runs (a) to (e), and every letter after the first is displaced by one.

Section 89(3) permits refusal where the award concerns a matter not capable of settlement by arbitration under Hong Kong law, or where enforcement would be contrary to public policy. Section 89(4) provides for severance of arbitral from unrelated decisions.

Section 89(5) enacts Article VI: where a set-aside or suspension application has been made as mentioned in section 89(2)(f), the court may adjourn the enforcement proceedings if it thinks fit, and may order security — expressly “on the application of the party seeking to enforce”. And section 89(6) is a provision with no counterpart elsewhere in this series: a decision or order under section 89(5) is not subject to appeal. That cuts both ways, but it removes a familiar delaying tactic.

The sequence from ground (f) is the same as everywhere else and is worth stating plainly: section 89(2)(f)(ii) is engaged only once the award has been set aside or suspended. A pending annulment application in the UAE — onshore under Article 53, or before the DIFC or ADGM courts — engages section 89(5), not refusal.

Order 73 rule 10, and service out

Order 73 rule 1 of the Rules of the High Court (Cap. 4A) makes the default route an originating summons to a single judge in court, but enforcement departs from it. Under rule 10(1)(d), an application for leave under section 84(1) “or in accordance with section 84 as provided by section 87(1)(b)” to enforce an award in the same manner as a judgment “may be made ex parte”, though the court hearing it may direct a summons to be issued. So for a UAE Convention award the application is made without notice as of right, subject to a judicial discretion to require a summons.

Rule 10(3) requires a supporting affidavit which, where the application is under section 87(1)(b), exhibits “the documents required to be produced under section 88”; states the name and usual or last known place of abode or business of the creditor and the debtor; and states either that the award has not been complied with or the extent to which it has not. For a body corporate, rule 10(8) reads those references as the registered or principal address.

Under rule 10(4) the order giving leave is drawn up by or on behalf of the creditor and served on the debtor; under rule 10(5) service of that order out of the jurisdiction is permissible without leave. Rule 10(6) gives the debtor 14 days after service to apply to set the order aside — or, where the order is to be served out of the jurisdiction, “such other period as the Court may fix” — and the award must not be enforced until that period expires or any application made within it is finally disposed of. Rule 10(6A) requires that application to be by summons supported by an affidavit filed at the same time, and rule 10(7) requires the served copy of the order to state the effect of rule 10(6).

Two further provisions are worth knowing. Rule 10A lets the court, where the debtor has applied to set aside, impose terms as to security or otherwise as a condition of the further conduct of that application — a useful lever against a debtor buying time. And rule 7(2) permits service out of the jurisdiction of the summons by which leave to enforce is sought, with the court's leave, whether or not the arbitration is governed by Hong Kong law. That is deliberately wider than rule 7(1), which for other Order 73 applications requires a Hong Kong-governed or Hong Kong-held arbitration, and it is the provision that makes a foreign-seated award enforceable against a foreign-served debtor.

Absolute state immunity

This is the section that decides whether Hong Kong is the right destination at all, and it is the most adverse rule in this series.

In Democratic Republic of the Congo v FG Hemisphere Associates LLC (Court of Final Appeal, FACV Nos 5, 6 and 7 of 2010) the majority held that the HKSAR cannot, as a matter of legal and constitutional principle, adhere to a doctrine of state immunity differing from that of the People's Republic of China, and that the doctrine practised in Hong Kong is accordingly one of absolute immunity. Asked squarely whether Hong Kong courts could adopt a commercial exception, the majority answered, in terms, “clearly ‘No’”.

The court referred questions on Articles 13(1) and 19 of the Basic Law to the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress under Article 158(3), so its judgment was provisional. The Interpretation was adopted on 26 August 2011, confirming that the Central People's Government determines the state immunity rules applying uniformly throughout the PRC and that HKSAR courts must apply them. The provisional majority judgment was then declared final on 8 September 2011, with a declaration that the Hong Kong courts had no jurisdiction over the DRC.

What makes this directly relevant is that the underlying dispute was the enforcement of arbitral awards against a state: ICC awards obtained in 2003 against the Republic of Zaire and its national electricity company, assigned to a fund which sought to enforce against DRC assets in Hong Kong. The enforcement vehicle was an application for leave under the then Arbitration Ordinance.

One limit should be stated honestly rather than glossed. The parties asked the court to focus on the recognition stage and leave execution aside, and the majority expressly declined to decide the execution-stage question because it did not arise. So the ratio concerns immunity from suit and recognition; the position at execution was not decided, and we have not found later authority on it.

The practical advice follows directly: where the award debtor is a foreign state, Hong Kong should not be the first destination considered, and the question of whether a particular Gulf state entity is the state or a separate entity has to be answered before any filing.

Public policy

The leading authority is Hebei Import & Export Corporation v Polytek Engineering Company Limited (Court of Final Appeal, FACV No 10 of 1998, 9 February 1999), decided on the predecessor of what is now section 89(3)(b). Sir Anthony Mason NPJ noted at [99] that Article V, and notably Article V(2)(b), have been given a narrow construction, and that “contrary to the public policy of that country” means contrary to the fundamental conceptions of morality and justice of the forum. Litton PJ's formulation at [9] is the one later courts cite: effect should be given to foreign awards as a matter of comity “unless to do so would violate the most basic notions of morality and justice”, and “[i]t would take a very strong case” to reach that conclusion where the same facts have been unsuccessfully challenged in the supervisory jurisdiction.

That last clause is worth noting for a UAE award: a debtor who has already run and lost an Article 53 annulment in the UAE faces a harder task in Hong Kong for having done so.

Applied at first instance in A v R (HCCT 54/2008, 30 April 2009), the ground is “a narrow ground”, and “[p]ublic policy itself leans towards the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards as a matter of comity”.

What we produce in the UAE

The section 88 documents, with a certified translation only if the award or agreement is not in English or Chinese; the consular legalisation chain through MOFAIC and the Chinese mission in the UAE, there being no apostille route; and the UAE-law certificate on the section 89(2)(f) position.

Because section 89(6) makes a section 89(5) decision unappealable, the certificate has to be right first time: it should establish the date the award was notified, whether an annulment action has been brought under Article 53 of the Federal Arbitration Law, whether one remains admissible under the 30-day bar in Article 54(2), whether enforcement has been stayed under Article 56, and whether the award has in fact been set aside. The full pack is on the UAE-side pack.

What this page does not state, and why

• A limitation period. Section 14(1) of Cap. 609 applies the Limitation Ordinance to arbitrations, and section 4(1)(c) of Cap. 347 prescribes six years from accrual for “actions to enforce an award, where the submission is not by an instrument under seal”. Note that Hong Kong has no free-standing provision equivalent to section 7 of the English Limitation Act 1980; the rule sits inside section 4(1)(c). But we have not been able to establish from any Hong Kong authority whether section 4(1)(c) catches the summary leave route as opposed to an action on the award, when the cause of action accrues, or how section 4(4)’s twelve years for an action upon a judgment interacts once judgment is entered under section 84(2). We therefore state the provision and not a usable deadline.
• The position at execution against a state. The Court of Final Appeal expressly left it undecided, and we have found no later authority.
• Whether non-compliance with section 88 is fatal or curable — for instance a defective authentication or a missing translation. No authority read.
• Whether section 91 would let a creditor enforce a Convention award by some route outside Division 2, and so escape section 89. That is a pure construction question on which we found no judgment, and we do not assert a creditor “choice” of refusal regime.
• How Hong Kong courts apply the carried-over Chinese commercial reservation in practice. We have read no authority on it.
• Whether a DIFC-seated or ADGM-seated award raises any distinct question under the seat-based definition in section 2(1).

Sources

• Arbitration Ordinance (Cap. 609) — sections 2(1), 14, 19, 84, 85, 86, and Division 2 of Part 10 (sections 87 to 91), read on e-legislation.gov.hk. Section 88 in its current form derives from 7 of 2013 section 12.
• Arbitration (Parties to New York Convention) Order, Cap. 609 sub. leg. A, made under section 90 — the Schedule names the United Arab Emirates; current version as at 19 March 2021, continued in force by section 110 of Cap. 609.
• Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, New York, 1958 — Articles IV, V, VI and XII. UAE accession 21 August 2006, in force 19 November 2006, no reservation recorded. The Convention applies to the HKSAR by virtue of China's declaration, notified in June 1997, with China's reservations carried over.
• Rules of the High Court (Cap. 4A), Order 73 — rules 1, 6, 7(2), 10, 10A; current version as at 1 October 2025.
• Democratic Republic of the Congo v FG Hemisphere Associates LLC, Court of Final Appeal, FACV Nos 5, 6 and 7 of 2010 — (2011) 14 HKCFAR 95 (8 June 2011, provisional) and (2011) 14 HKCFAR 395 (8 September 2011, final); absolute state immunity, no commercial exception; execution stage not decided. The NPCSC Interpretation of Article 13(1) and Article 19 of the Basic Law was adopted on 26 August 2011.
• Hebei Import & Export Corporation v Polytek Engineering Company Limited, Court of Final Appeal, FACV No 10 of 1998, (1999) 2 HKCFAR 111 — the public policy standard; and A v R, HCCT 54/2008, 30 April 2009.
• Limitation Ordinance (Cap. 347) — sections 4(1)(c), 4(3), 4(4) and 40.
• Federal Law 6 of 2018 on Arbitration, as amended by Federal Decree-Law 15 of 2023 — Articles 53, 54(2) and 56, which govern what the UAE-law certificate can say.

Ordinances, rules and judgments checked 4 November 2026 against e-legislation.gov.hk and legalref.judiciary.hk. The Court of Final Appeal judgments carry no neutral citation and are cited by FACV number and law report reference; report pinpoints are taken from the Judiciary’s own records rather than the printed reports. Hong Kong procedure is confirmed with Hong Kong counsel before filing; we act on the UAE side.

UAE award, Hong Kong assets?

Hong Kong needs no evidence of the UAE's treaty status, which makes it one of the cleaner destinations — unless the debtor is a state, where absolute immunity applies. Send us the award and we will tell you which of those you are in and what the section 88 pack requires.

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