Enforcing a UAE arbitral award in England and Wales

Why a UAE award qualifies — and the Order in Council that does not name it

Section 100(1) defines a New York Convention award as one made, under a written arbitration agreement, in the territory of a state other than the United Kingdom which is a party to the Convention. Section 100(2)(b) then supplies the rule that decides the question for an arbitration administered in the Gulf: an award “shall be treated as made at the seat of the arbitration”, regardless of where it was signed, despatched or delivered. A Dubai or Abu Dhabi seat therefore makes the award one made in UAE territory even if the tribunal signed it elsewhere.

The UAE acceded to the Convention on 21 August 2006, in force 19 November 2006, and took no reservation under Article I(3). The United Kingdom acceded on 24 September 1975.

There is a wrinkle here that is worth knowing before a debtor raises it. Section 100(3) provides that an Order in Council declaring a state to be a party “shall, while in force, be conclusive evidence of that fact”. The series of Arbitration (Foreign Awards) Orders that performed that function appears to stop at SI 1993/1256, which was made under the Arbitration Act 1975 and declared only Antigua and Barbuda. We have found no Order naming the United Arab Emirates — which is unsurprising, since the last Order in the series predates UAE accession by thirteen years.

That is not a defect in the creditor’s position, and the distinction is the whole point. Section 100(3) is a conclusive-evidence provision, not a precondition. The definition in section 100(1) turns on the fact of accession; an Order merely offers a shortcut to proving it. Absent an Order, the creditor proves UAE accession by ordinary evidence, and the natural source is the United Nations depositary record. In practice this has caused no difficulty: a Dubai award was enforced under section 101(2) in Honeywell v Meydan with no reported argument about Convention status at all.

The application: section 101 and CPR 62.18

Two different things happen under section 101, and conflating them wastes a step. Section 101(1) provides that a Convention award “shall be recognised as binding” and may be relied on “by way of defence, set-off or otherwise” — that is automatic and needs no leave. Only enforcement requires leave, under section 101(2), after which section 101(3) permits judgment to be entered in terms of the award.

Procedurally, CPR 62.18(1)(b) allows the application for permission to be made without notice in an arbitration claim form. CPR 62.18(6) requires supporting written evidence which exhibits the section 102 documents, gives the usual or last known place of residence or business of both parties, and states either that the award has not been complied with or the extent to which it has not.

CPR 62.18(9) is the provision to diarise. The debtor has 14 days after service of the order to apply to set it aside — or, where the order is served out of the jurisdiction, “such other period as the court may set”. And the award must not be enforced until that period has expired or any application made within it has been finally disposed of. The order itself must state both the right to apply and that restriction, under CPR 62.18(10).

One further door is worth noting: section 104 preserves any right to rely on or enforce a Convention award at common law or under section 66. If the section 102 documents present a problem, the Convention route is not the only one.

Section 102 documents, against Article IV

Section 102(1) requires exactly two documents: the duly authenticated original award or a duly certified copy, and the original arbitration agreement or a duly certified copy. Section 102(2) adds a translation, where either is in a foreign language, certified by an official or sworn translator or by a diplomatic or consular agent.

Section 102 imposes no requirement beyond Article IV of the Convention. Same two documents, same certifiers. That matters because it means an English court has no statutory warrant to require a UAE ratification order, a certificate of enforceability from a Dubai court, or anything else outside the list. Three textual divergences are worth knowing but none of them adds a document: Article IV requires the documents “at the time of the application” where section 102 is silent on timing and CPR 62.18(6)(a)(ii) supplies it; Article IV(1)(b) refers to the agreement “referred to in article II” where section 102(1)(b) takes its writing test from section 5 of the Act instead; and Article IV(2) is triggered by a document not in an official language of the enforcing country where section 102(2) simply says “in a foreign language”.

Section 103 refusal grounds, and the lettering trap

Section 103(1) is emphatic: recognition or enforcement “shall not be refused except in the following cases”. The grounds are exhaustive and, under section 103(2), the burden lies on the award debtor.

Before citing them, note a trap. The Act splits Article V(1)(a) of the Convention into two paragraphs — section 103(2)(a) for incapacity and section 103(2)(b) for invalidity of the agreement — so every letter after that is displaced by one against the Convention:

Section 103(4) allows severance, so an award containing decisions outside the submission may still be enforced as to the parts within it. Section 103(5) carries Article VI: the court may adjourn where a set-aside application has been made at the seat, and may order the other party to give suitable security — but only on the application of the party claiming enforcement.

On how the grounds are decided, Honeywell v Meydan held that “may be refused” introduces a discretion that is not open-ended, that the burden under section 103(2) is on the respondent while the court may raise section 103(3) of its own motion, and that the grounds should generally be determined on the summary-judgment standard rather than at a full trial.

A pending Dubai annulment: section 103(2)(f) or section 103(5)?

This is the question a UAE award creditor will actually face, and the answer is favourable but it is often stated wrongly.

In IPCO (Nigeria) Ltd v Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation [2005] EWHC 726 (Comm) at [12], Gross J held that section 103(2)(f) “is only applicable when there has been an order or decision suspending the award by the court in the country of origin”. It is not triggered automatically by a challenge brought at the seat — a conclusion that follows from the wording and is confirmed by section 103(5), which would otherwise be pointless. Honeywell v Meydan adopted and applied it.

So an annulment action under Article 53 of the Federal Arbitration Law, merely pending before a UAE Court of Appeal, does not give the debtor a section 103(2)(f) defence. What it gives the debtor is an invitation to ask the English court to adjourn under section 103(5). The factors are those set out in IPCO at [15]: whether the application at the seat is brought bona fide and not simply as a delaying tactic; whether it has at least a realistic prospect of success; and the extent of the delay an adjournment would cause and any resulting prejudice. The court applies these on a sliding scale rather than as a threshold test.

And there is a limit on what the debtor can be made to pay for. In IPCO [2017] UKSC 16 the Supreme Court held that security under section 103(5) is available only as the price of an adjournment: where the court decides to determine a resistance ground itself rather than adjourn, there is no adjournment and so no basis for security. There is no power to make the determination of a properly arguable section 103(2) or 103(3) ground conditional on security for the award, and CPR 3.1(3) does not supply one. Articles V and VI, the Court said, constitute a code.

The practical consequence for the UAE side of the file is that the UAE-law evidence has to distinguish three states of affairs that debtors routinely blur: no annulment action brought; an action brought and pending; and an award actually set aside or its enforcement stayed under Article 56. Only the third engages section 103(2)(f). A pending action is not a suspension.

Honeywell v Meydan, and why it matters here

Honeywell International Middle East Ltd v Meydan Group LLC [2014] EWHC 1344 (TCC) is the case to put in front of a client asking whether this works. A Dubai-seated DIAC award (DIAC Case No. 201/2010) for AED 77,080,272.44 was enforced in England.

The route was the one described above: a without-notice application under section 101(2) and CPR 62.18(1)(b), supported by a witness statement exhibiting the section 102 documents. Leave was granted, with a 21-day set-aside period rather than 14 because service was out of the jurisdiction — a live illustration of the “such other period as the court may set” limb of CPR 62.18(9). The debtor then resisted on grounds under sections 103(2) and 103(3), including that the award was not binding, want of notice, forgery, bribery and public policy, and abuse of process. None had a real prospect of success; the set-aside application was dismissed and the enforcement order took effect.

The holding we would single out is at [153]: whether an award has become binding is a question for the enforcing court, and local Dubai court processes are not necessary for an award to become binding under the Convention. That is the English courts saying, in a UAE case, what the UAE-side pack says about not seeking ratification reflexively before going abroad. A creditor who ratifies first has not strengthened an English application; it has spent time and given the debtor an Article 53 forum it had otherwise lost under Article 54(2).

If the debtor is a state

The State Immunity Act 1978 separates immunity from suit and immunity from execution, and the second is where creditors come unstuck.

Section 9(1) removes immunity: where a state has agreed in writing to arbitrate, it is not immune as respects proceedings in United Kingdom courts which relate to the arbitration. Section 9(2) makes this subject to contrary provision in the arbitration agreement and inapplicable to agreements between states.

Execution is a different matter. Section 13(2)(b) provides that the property of a state shall not be subject to any process for the enforcement of a judgment or arbitration award. Section 13(4) then disapplies that for property “in use or intended for use for commercial purposes”. The trap is section 13(3): written consent lifts the bar, but “a provision merely submitting to the jurisdiction of the courts is not to be regarded as a consent”. An arbitration clause is not, without more, consent to execution. And section 13(5) shifts the evidential burden against the creditor: a certificate from the head of the state’s diplomatic mission that property is not in use for commercial purposes is accepted as sufficient evidence unless the contrary is proved.

What we produce in the UAE

The certified award and the arbitration agreement in the form section 102 requires, with a translation certified by a sworn translator or a consular agent where needed; the consular legalisation chain through MOFAIC and the British mission in the UAE, the UAE not being a Hague Apostille party; and the UAE-law certificate directed squarely at section 103(2)(f) and section 103(5).

Given IPCO, that certificate should state the date the award was notified to the parties, whether an annulment action has been brought under Article 53 of the Federal Arbitration Law, whether one remains admissible under the 30-day bar in Article 54(2), whether any order has been made staying enforcement under Article 56, and whether the award has in fact been set aside. The full pack is on the UAE-side pack.

What this page does not state, and why

• Whether a DIFC-seated or ADGM-seated award is a “New York Convention award” for section 100(1). On the face of the section the test is territorial — an award made “in the territory of a state” — and both financial centres sit within UAE territory, which suggests such awards do qualify. We have found no English authority on the point and we do not assert one. For a UAE readership this is probably the most commercially significant open question on this page, and we would take it as a discrete question before filing.
• A limitation period for enforcement under section 101(2). Section 7 of the Limitation Act 1980 fixes six years from accrual for an action to enforce an award, and in National Ability SA v Tinna Oils & Chemicals Ltd [2009] EWCA Civ 1330 the Court of Appeal held that section 7 covers both the action on the award and the summary application under section 66. But Tinna concerned section 26 of the 1950 Act and section 66 of the 1996 Act; it does not mention section 101, Part III or the Convention. The reasoning transfers naturally and we would expect the same answer, but we are not willing to state it as settled.
• That the application must be issued in the Commercial Court. Practice Direction 62 Section III contains no allocation provision, and paragraphs 2.1 and 2.3 are confined to Section I claims. The only allocation rule we could read for sections 66 and 101(2) is the Allocation of Arbitration Proceedings Order 1996 (SI 1996/3215), articles 2 and 4 — High Court, with a county court permitted. Honeywell itself was decided in the TCC.
• That no Order in Council has been made under section 100(3) since 1996. Our search of the statutory instruments was by title. A negative result from a title search is not conclusive.
• Court fees, and the mechanics of execution once judgment is entered in terms of the award.

Sources

• Arbitration Act 1996, Part III — sections 100 to 104, and section 66, read in the current consolidated text on legislation.gov.uk. The Arbitration Act 2025 (Royal Assent 24 February 2025; commenced 1 August 2025 by SI 2025/905) amends only provisions in Part I and does not amend sections 66 or 100 to 104.
• Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, New York, 1958 — Articles III to VII, official UN text. UAE accession 21 August 2006, in force 19 November 2006, no Article I(3) reservation; United Kingdom accession 24 September 1975.
• CPR Part 62, Section III — rules 62.17, 62.18 and 62.19, and Practice Direction 62; the High Court and County Courts (Allocation of Arbitration Proceedings) Order 1996, SI 1996/3215, articles 2 and 4.
• Honeywell International Middle East Ltd v Meydan Group LLC [2014] EWHC 1344 (TCC) — a Dubai DIAC award enforced; the section 103 framework and the summary-judgment standard; binding status a question for the enforcing court.
• IPCO (Nigeria) Ltd v Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation [2005] EWHC 726 (Comm) — section 103(2)(f) requires an actual set-aside or suspension; the section 103(5) adjournment factors.
• IPCO (Nigeria) Ltd v Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation [2017] UKSC 16 — security under section 103(5) available only as the price of an adjournment.
• National Ability SA v Tinna Oils & Chemicals Ltd [2009] EWCA Civ 1330 — section 7 of the Limitation Act 1980 applied to both methods of enforcing an award.
• State Immunity Act 1978 — sections 9 and 13(2) to (5).
• Federal Law 6 of 2018 on Arbitration, as amended by Federal Decree-Law 15 of 2023 — Articles 53, 54(2) and 56, which govern what the UAE-law certificate can say.

Statutes, rules and judgments checked 4 November 2026 against legislation.gov.uk, justice.gov.uk and the National Archives Find Case Law service. English procedure and the current standing of the authorities are confirmed with English counsel before filing; we act on the UAE side.

UAE award, English assets?

England has already done this for a Dubai award, and the UAE-law evidence is the part of the file that decides it. Send us the award and we will tell you what the section 102 documents and the Article V(1)(e) certificate need to establish before English counsel is instructed.

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