A determination by the Conflicts of Jurisdiction Tribunal directing the DIFC Courts to cease hearing a claim does not, without an express order to that effect, retrospectively vacate orders the DIFC Courts had already made before the determination issued. The CFI judge erred in reading the CJT's prospective cessation order as authority to extinguish prior costs awards, discharge orders, and other interlocutory relief already granted. The decision settles a consequential point on the interface between Dubai Decree No. (29) of 2024 and existing DIFC Court orders. Article 9(c) of the Decree, which exposes subsequent rulings that conflict with CJT precedent to challenge on appeal, applies to rulings made after a CJT decision, not before it. Parties who have secured substantive DIFC relief — costs orders, freezing orders set aside, default judgments vacated — should not assume that a later CJT jurisdiction transfer automatically extinguishes that relief. The CJT's effect is prospective unless it expressly orders otherwise.
Decision
The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and set aside the October Orders in their entirety, together with the associated costs order made against the Appellant on 21 January 2026. The court held that the CJT's determination neither purported to, nor had the effect of, vacating the August Orders: its language was confined to prospective cessation of proceedings and contained no direction — express or implied — that pre-existing DIFC orders should be treated as nullities. The CFI judge therefore erred in concluding that the CJT's determination deprived those earlier orders of their legal effect. Because the appeal was resolved on the second issue, the court expressly declined to decide the first issue — whether the Decree could ever authorise retrospective withdrawal of jurisdiction already exercised — treating that constitutional question as one the CJT itself should address in an appropriate future case. The third issue, procedural fairness, was rendered unnecessary to decide. The Respondent was ordered to pay the Appellant's costs of the appeal fixed at AED 200,000 and the costs of the permission application to the Chief Justice on the standard basis.
Facts
The Appellant (Ganesan Muthiah) and Respondent (Abdul Rahman Mohammad) are co-shareholders in Gulf IT Network Distribution – Freezone – LLC ('Gulf IT'), incorporated in Dubai International City. A dispute arose over the dissolution and liquidation of Gulf IT. In June 2025 the Respondent commenced Claim No. CFI-055-2025 in the DIFC Court of First Instance and obtained both a default judgment and an ex parte worldwide freezing order ('WFO') against the Appellant. On 19 August 2025 the CFI made substantial orders in the Appellant's favour (the 'August Orders'): it set aside the default judgment; discharged the WFO; declared that service of the claim on the Appellant was defective; dismissed the Respondent's application for continuation of the WFO; struck out the Respondent's claim as an abuse of process; and ordered the Respondent to pay the Appellant's costs assessed at AED 1,059,592. The Appellant then applied for the appointment of a receiver over the Respondent's shares in Gulf IT to enforce that costs award. On 29 September 2025, acting of its own motion, the CFI set aside its earlier quantification of costs and directed that those costs, if not agreed, be assessed on the standard basis. Separately, the Appellant had applied to the CJT under Dubai Decree No. (29) of 2024 for a determination that the Dubai Courts — rather than the DIFC Courts — were the competent forum. The Respondent did not oppose this; he had already commenced Case No. 1000/2025 (Commercial Major) in the Dubai Courts against the Appellant, and he asked the CJT both to confirm Dubai Courts jurisdiction and to suspend all DIFC proceedings, including any related applications or appeals, and to declare the DIFC Courts divested of jurisdiction. On 13 October 2025 the CJT issued its determination. It noted that both parties contested DIFC jurisdiction and that the Respondent sought suspension of all DIFC proceedings. In the interests of the proper administration of justice and to avoid conflicting or inconsistent judgments, the CJT resolved that the Dubai Courts — as the court of general jurisdiction — should be the competent authority. Its operative paragraphs stated: '1. The Application is allowed. 2. The Dubai Courts shall have jurisdiction to hear Case No. 1000/2025. 3. The DIFC Courts shall cease hearing case No. CFI-055-2025.' On 20 October 2025, acting on its own motion and without inviting submissions from either party, the CFI judge made the 'October Orders', declaring that the DIFC Courts lacked jurisdiction, vacating all prior orders in their entirety — including the August Orders and the costs award of AED 1,059,592 — and dismissing all outstanding applications including the enforcement application. The Appellant sought permission to appeal; the CFI judge refused and ordered costs against the Appellant on 29 January 2026. Permission was subsequently granted by the Chief Justice on 26 March 2026, and the matter proceeded to the Court of Appeal.
Issues before the court
- Whether Dubai Decree No. (29) of 2024 contemplates that a CJT determination under Article 4 can retrospectively withdraw the jurisdictional authority already exercised by the DIFC Courts, so as to deprive orders made before the CJT's determination of legal effect?
- Whether the CJT's determination of 13 October 2025 — that the DIFC Courts 'shall cease hearing' the claim — in fact purported to nullify or vacate the August Orders made by the DIFC Court prior to that determination?
- Whether the CFI judge's decision to vacate the August Orders on his own motion, without inviting submissions from either party, was vitiated by a denial of procedural fairness to the Appellant?
The court's reasoning
The Court of Appeal structured its analysis across three issues, resolving the appeal on the second alone while preserving the first for the CJT and leaving the third undecided. Issue 1 — whether the Decree authorises retrospective withdrawal of jurisdiction The Appellant's principal textual argument turned on Article 9(c) of Dubai Decree No. (29) of 2024, which provides that rules of law established by the CJT are binding judicial precedents and that any conflict between a subsequent judicial ruling and those rules provides grounds for challenging that ruling through legally prescribed means of appeal. The Appellant argued that the word 'subsequent' is directed at rulings made after a CJT decision, not before it: a prior order cannot logically be characterised as a 'subsequent' ruling susceptible to challenge on that basis. The court found this reasoning compelling. It also noted that Article 9(b) makes CJT decisions final and not subject to any form of appeal, and that Article 4(b) grants the CJT a distinct power to determine the enforceable judgment in the event of conflicting judgments between the DIFC Courts and a Judicial Entity — a power that would be superfluous if every CJT cessation order automatically nullified prior DIFC orders. Despite finding the Appellant's argument persuasive, the court declined to decide the constitutional question definitively. The court reasoned that doing so was unnecessary given its findings on Issue 2, and that the question of whether the Decree could authorise retrospective divestiture of jurisdiction already exercised is one the CJT — as the constitutionally designated arbiter of jurisdictional conflicts under the Decree — should address directly in an appropriate future case. The court characterised its restraint as a matter of deference to the CJT's institutional role. Issue 2 — the proper construction of the CJT's 13 October 2025 determination This issue was determinative. The court undertook a close textual reading of the CJT's operative paragraphs. Their language was unambiguous: the Dubai Courts shall have jurisdiction over the Dubai Courts case; the DIFC Courts shall cease hearing CFI-055-2025. The court noted four significant features of what the CJT did not do. First, the CJT made no reference to the August Orders. Second, it did not purport to divest the DIFC Courts of the jurisdiction they had already exercised in making those orders. Third, it included no direction that prior relief be vacated. Fourth — and the court treated this as particularly telling — the CJT expressly possesses, under Article 4(b), the power to determine the enforceable judgment where conflicting judgments have been issued by the DIFC Courts and a Judicial Entity. The CJT plainly knows how to address prior court orders when it wishes to do so. Its silence on the August Orders was not an oversight; it was a deliberate limitation on the scope of the determination. The court concluded that the October Orders rested on a misreading of the CJT's determination. By holding that the CJT's direction to cease hearing the claim operated to vacate all prior orders 'in their entirety', the CFI judge attributed to the CJT a retrospective effect its language did not bear and a power it had not exercised. The judge had described the October Orders as 'formally implementing' the CJT decision as a matter of 'constitutional and statutory delegation'; the Court of Appeal held that this characterisation was wrong. The CJT had determined the prospective forum for the dispute; it had said nothing about the juridical status of orders already made. Issue 3 — procedural fairness Given the disposal on Issue 2, the court found it unnecessary to decide whether the CFI judge's failure to invite submissions before making the October Orders on his own motion independently vitiated those orders. The October Orders had been made without any application from either party and without the parties being invited to make submissions; the court noted these facts but did not rule on their legal consequences.
Applicable law
- Dubai Decree No. (29) of 2024, Article 4(a) — CJT power to determine the competent judicial entity having jurisdiction over any claim or application in respect of which a conflict of jurisdiction arises between the DIFC Courts and any of the Judicial Entities
- Dubai Decree No. (29) of 2024, Article 4(b) — CJT power to determine the enforceable judgment in the event of delivery of conflicting judgments by the DIFC Courts and any Judicial Entity in respect of claims involving the same litigants and subject matter
- Dubai Decree No. (29) of 2024, Article 9(b) — decisions issued by the CJT determining a competent judicial entity or an enforceable judgment are final and not subject to any form of appeal
- Dubai Decree No. (29) of 2024, Article 9(c) — rules of law established by the CJT in decisions issued pursuant to the Decree are binding judicial precedents on all judicial entities at all levels including the DIFC Courts; any conflict of a subsequent judicial ruling with those rules provides grounds for challenging that ruling through legally prescribed means of appeal
- Rules of the DIFC Courts (RDC) — governing procedure including own-motion orders and costs
Practical implications
Practitioners advising clients in concurrent DIFC and Dubai Courts proceedings must revisit their risk frameworks in light of this decision. First, a CJT transfer order directing the DIFC Courts to cease hearing a claim will not extinguish costs awards, injunctions, default judgments set aside, or any other interlocutory relief already granted, unless the CJT expressly directs otherwise. Parties who have secured such relief should resist any CFI motion to vacate it on the mere basis of a cessation order. They should insist on their right to file submissions before any own-motion order is made, given the Court of Appeal's clear signal — even without deciding the point — that unilateral own-motion orders made without party input are procedurally vulnerable. Second, parties contemplating a CJT application must think carefully about timing. An application filed before the DIFC Courts have made substantive orders leaves the applicant exposed: those orders will survive a successful jurisdiction transfer unless the CJT is separately asked to address them under Article 4(b). Conversely, a party that has obtained favourable DIFC relief should resist a CJT application promptly and on the record, ensuring that any transfer order cannot be misread — as happened here — as implicitly vacating prior relief. Third, where a party genuinely seeks to unwind prior DIFC orders through the CJT process, it must invoke Article 4(b) directly, framing the application as one for determination of the enforceable judgment as between conflicting court orders. Silence in a CJT determination will now be construed as leaving prior DIFC orders intact. Fourth, the court's express reservation on the broader constitutional question means that residual uncertainty remains. If the CJT is asked in a future case to address prior DIFC orders under Article 4(b), it may conclude that the Decree does authorise retrospective divestiture in that context. Enforcement strategies and litigation funding assessments should account for this live question.
Precedent value: This is a binding decision of the DIFC Court of Appeal and constitutes the first appellate-level authority on the temporal reach of a CJT cessation order vis-à-vis pre-existing DIFC Court orders. It establishes that a CJT direction to cease hearing a claim operates prospectively and does not, without more, nullify orders the DIFC Courts had already made. The court's analysis of Article 9(c)'s 'subsequent ruling' language — though left formally undecided as a constitutional proposition — will be persuasive to the CJT itself and to any tribunal grappling with the same question. The decision also implicitly reinforces the significance of Article 4(b) as the correct mechanism for addressing prior conflicting judgments: where a party wishes a CJT determination to have retrospective effect on existing DIFC orders, it must seek relief under that provision expressly.
Action point
Any party who has obtained substantive interlocutory relief in DIFC proceedings — costs orders, freezing orders, default judgments set aside — where a CJT jurisdiction transfer is pending or has already been made should immediately review whether the CFI has purported to vacate that relief on the basis of the CJT determination, and take steps to restore it if so. Parties currently before, or considering an application to, the CJT should obtain specialist advice on whether their application should expressly invoke Article 4(b) of Dubai Decree No. (29) of 2024 to address prior DIFC orders, since the CJT's silence on those orders will now be construed as leaving them in full effect.
Source
This case note is generated from a public court record and reviewed under the firm's automated editorial quality gate. General information only — it does not constitute legal advice. For advice on a specific matter, please contact us.