A determination by the Conflicts of Jurisdiction Tribunal directing that the DIFC Courts cease hearing a claim does not vacate or nullify orders those courts made before the determination issued. The CFI judge had, on his own motion and without inviting submissions from either party, set aside all prior orders — including a costs award of AED 1,059,592 and a discharge of a worldwide freezing order — on the basis that the CJT's determination retrospectively stripped the DIFC Court of jurisdiction. The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal on the ground that the CJT's determination simply did not say that. Its operative paragraph directed only that the DIFC Courts shall cease hearing the claim; it said nothing about prior orders. Article 9(c) of Dubai Decree No. 29 of 2024, which binds all courts to CJT precedents, operates against subsequent rulings, not orders already made.
Decision
The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and set aside the October Orders in their entirety. The decisive basis was that the CJT's determination of 13 October 2025 did not purport to vacate the August Orders, did not declare the DIFC Court to have lacked jurisdiction when it made those orders, and did not strip retroactive effect from orders already made before the determination issued. The CFI judge accordingly erred in reading the CJT's determination as having that effect. Because the appeal was resolved on the second issue, the Court expressly declined — out of deference to the CJT — to decide the broader constitutional question in the first issue of whether the Decree could ever authorise a CJT determination to operate retrospectively on prior court orders. The third issue, concerning procedural fairness, was similarly left undecided as unnecessary. The costs order made against the Appellant on the Initial Application was set aside. The Respondent was ordered to pay the Appellant's costs of the appeal fixed at AED 200,000, and to pay the Appellant's costs of the application to the Chief Justice for permission to appeal on the standard basis, to be assessed if not agreed.
Facts
The Appellant (Ganesan Muthiah) and Respondent (Abdul Rahman Mohammad) are shareholders in Gulf IT Network Distribution – Freezone – LLC, a company located in Dubai International City. Their dispute concerned the dissolution and liquidation of Gulf IT. In June 2025, the Respondent commenced Claim No. CFI-055-2025 in the DIFC Court of First Instance. He obtained a default judgment against the Appellant and an ex parte worldwide freezing order over the Appellant's assets. On 19 August 2025, the CFI made the August Orders, which: set aside the default judgment; discharged the WFO; declared that service of the claim on the Appellant had been defective; dismissed the Respondent's application for continuation of the WFO; ordered the Respondent to pay the Appellant's costs assessed at AED 1,059,592; and declared that the court lacked jurisdiction to grant the default judgment, striking out the claim as an abuse of process. The Appellant then applied for the appointment of a receiver over the Respondent's shares in Gulf IT to enforce the costs award. On 29 September 2025, the CFI, acting on its own motion, set aside its earlier costs assessment and directed that costs be assessed on the standard basis if not agreed. In parallel, the Appellant applied to the CJT for a determination that the Dubai Courts were the competent forum. The Respondent did not oppose that application. Instead, he affirmatively commenced Case No. 1000 of 2025 (Commercial Major) in the Dubai Courts and sought an order from the CJT confirming Dubai Courts' jurisdiction, declaring the DIFC Courts divested of jurisdiction, and suspending all DIFC proceedings including any related applications or appeals. On 13 October 2025, the CJT issued its determination. It noted that both parties contested the jurisdiction of the DIFC Courts. Concluding that, in the interests of the proper administration of justice and to avoid conflicting or inconsistent judgments, only one court should remain seized of the case, and that the Courts of Greater Dubai enjoyed general jurisdiction, the CJT determined that the Dubai Courts should be the competent authority. The operative paragraphs of the determination were: (1) the application is allowed; (2) the Dubai Courts shall have jurisdiction to hear Case No. 1000/2025; (3) the DIFC Courts shall cease hearing Case No. CFI-055-2025. The CJT did not purport to divest the DIFC Courts of the jurisdiction they had already exercised, did not purport to vacate the August Orders, and did not suggest that the DIFC Court lacked jurisdiction to make those orders when it did. Despite this, on 20 October 2025, the CFI judge, acting on his own motion and without any application by either party and without inviting submissions on the consequences of the CJT's determination, made the October Orders: declaring that the DIFC Courts lacked jurisdiction to hear the claim; vacating all prior orders and directions in their entirety; dismissing all outstanding applications including those relating to enforcement; and making no order as to costs. The judge's reasons, issued on 13 January 2026, described the October Orders as formally implementing the CJT determination and as a proper exercise of discretion on costs. The Appellant sought permission to appeal, which the same judge refused on 21 January 2026 with costs awarded against the Appellant. On a renewed application, the Chief Justice granted permission to appeal on all grounds save those relating to a stay of the costs orders.
Issues before the court
- Whether Dubai Decree No. 29 of 2024, and Article 4 thereof, contemplates that a CJT determination can withdraw jurisdiction from a court that has already exercised it, thereby retrospectively nullifying orders already made before the determination issued.
- Whether the CJT's determination of 13 October 2025 in fact purported to vacate the August Orders of the DIFC Court or otherwise divest the DIFC Court of the jurisdiction it had already exercised in making those orders.
- Whether the CFI judge erred in making the October Orders on his own motion without affording the Appellant an opportunity to be heard, thereby denying procedural fairness.
The court's reasoning
The Court of Appeal structured its analysis around three sequentially ordered issues and resolved the appeal on the second alone, declining to reach the first or the third. That sequencing is itself significant. By refusing to decide whether the Decree could in principle authorise the CJT to nullify prior DIFC judicial orders, the Court consciously preserved a constitutionally weighty question for a case where its resolution is unavoidable. The restraint signals that the question is live; it does not foreclose it. The core of the reasoning turns on a close reading of the CJT's 13 October 2025 determination. The operative paragraph directed only that 'the DIFC Courts shall cease hearing case No. CFI-055-2025.' The Court of Appeal observed, pointedly, that the CJT did not purport to divest the DIFC Courts of jurisdiction already exercised, did not purport to vacate the August Orders, and did not suggest that the DIFC Court lacked jurisdiction to make those orders when it did. This is a straightforward interpretive point, but it is the load-bearing element of the judgment. The CFI judge's error was not a constitutional one but one of reading: he attributed to the CJT a determination the CJT had not made. The judge's own characterisation of the October Orders — as formally implementing the CJT decision as a matter of constitutional and statutory delegation — did not survive scrutiny because there was nothing in the CJT's determination to implement in the way the judge described. The Court reinforced this conclusion by reference to Article 9(c) of Dubai Decree No. 29 of 2024. That provision deems rules of law established by the CJT to be judicial precedents binding on all judicial entities at all levels, including the DIFC Courts, and it provides that conflict of a subsequent judicial ruling with any such rule constitutes grounds for challenge through any legally prescribed means of appeal. The Appellant's argument, accepted by the Court, was that Article 9(c) speaks in terms of a subsequent judicial ruling, meaning an order made after a CJT determination, not a prior order already made. The textual emphasis on subsequence confirms that the Decree's binding-precedent mechanism operates prospectively. It does not, on its face, reach back to orders that pre-date the CJT's determination. This textual analysis reinforced the conclusion that neither the Decree itself nor the specific CJT determination authorised the retroactive vacation of the August Orders. The Court also recorded the procedural irregularity with evident concern. The October Orders were made on the judge's own motion; neither party had applied for them nor been invited to make submissions on what consequences should follow from the CJT's determination. The affected orders — including the AED 1,059,592 costs award and the enforcement application — had been obtained after adversarial argument. While the Court found it unnecessary to decide the appeal on procedural fairness grounds given its resolution on the second issue, its observations carry practical weight for any party who faces a material sua sponte order in similar circumstances.
Applicable law
- Dubai Decree No. 29 of 2024, Article 4 — confers on the Conflicts of Jurisdiction Tribunal the power and duty to determine the competent judicial entity having jurisdiction over any claim in respect of which a conflict of jurisdiction arises between the DIFC Courts and any of the Judicial Entities of Greater Dubai.
- Dubai Decree No. 29 of 2024, Article 9(a) — the Judicial Committee issues its decisions in the name of the Ruler.
- Dubai Decree No. 29 of 2024, Article 9(b) — decisions issued by the Judicial Committee determining a competent judicial entity or an enforceable judgment are final and not subject to any form of appeal.
- Dubai Decree No. 29 of 2024, Article 9(c) — rules of law established by the Judicial Committee constitute binding judicial precedents on all judicial entities at all levels including the DIFC Courts; conflict of a subsequent judicial ruling with any such rule provides grounds for challenging that ruling through any legally prescribed means of appeal.
- Rules of the DIFC Courts (RDC) — the governing procedural framework within which the CFI and Court of Appeal exercise jurisdiction, expressly invoked as the basis for the Court of Appeal's orders.
Practical implications
Several consequences flow from this decision for practitioners managing disputes that straddle DIFC and Dubai Courts jurisdiction. First, parties holding substantive DIFC orders — costs awards, injunctions, asset freezing orders, or default judgments — before a CJT determination issues should not assume those orders are automatically extinguished by a subsequent determination to transfer the dispute. The CJT determination must be examined on its own terms. Unless it expressly vacates prior orders or declares that the DIFC Court lacked jurisdiction to make them, those orders remain effective and enforceable. Second, parties applying to the CJT for a transfer of jurisdiction must consider whether to seek, as part of that application, an express order addressing the status of existing DIFC court orders. In this case the Respondent sought suspension of all DIFC proceedings, but the CJT did not go that far; practitioners should not assume the CJT will address prior orders without targeted submissions requesting that outcome. Third, judgment creditors with DIFC costs or substantive orders in their favour should move promptly to enforce before any CJT application is made by the counterparty. Enforcement applications caught mid-stream by a transfer scenario may face practical suspension even where, as this case confirms, the orders themselves survive. Fourth, DIFC judges must invite submissions before making consequential orders on their own motion, particularly where those orders vacate relief obtained after adversarial hearings. Any party facing a material sua sponte order should apply immediately for an opportunity to be heard. Fifth, the open constitutional question — whether the Decree permits the CJT to operate retrospectively on prior orders — remains live. Until it is resolved, parties and their advisers should treat the enforceability of pre-determination DIFC orders as a risk to be actively managed rather than assumed.
Precedent value: As a decision of the DIFC Court of Appeal, this judgment binds the DIFC Court of First Instance and constitutes authoritative guidance on the interpretation of Dubai Decree No. 29 of 2024. It establishes that a CJT determination directing the DIFC Courts to cease hearing a claim does not, without more, operate to nullify orders the DIFC Court made before the determination issued, and that Article 9(c) of the Decree binds courts to CJT precedents only in respect of subsequent rulings. The broader question — whether the Decree could authorise a CJT determination to operate retrospectively on prior court orders — was expressly left open and remains to be decided.
Action point
Parties holding DIFC Court orders — injunctions, costs awards, or judgments — whose counterparty has commenced or is likely to commence CJT proceedings should immediately review whether those orders remain enforceable and take active steps to progress enforcement before any CJT determination issues.
Source
This case note is generated from a public court record and reviewed under the firm's automated editorial quality gate. General information only — it does not constitute legal advice. For advice on a specific matter, please contact us.